Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) executed through accelerated underwritings have increased global market share recently, raising over $850 billion since 1998, and now account for over half (two-thirds) of the value of U.S. (European) SEOs. We examine 31,242 global SEOs, executed during 1991-2004, which raise over $2.9 trillion for firms and selling shareholders. Compared to fully marketed deals, accelerated offerings occur more rapidly, raise more money, and require fewer underwriters. Importantly, accelerated deals reduce total issuance cost by about 250 basis points. Accelerated deals sell equal fractions of primary and secondary shares, whereas in traditional SEOs primary shares dominate. Announcement period returns are comparable for traditional and accelerated offerings, while secondary and mixed offerings trigger more negative market responses than do primary offerings. We conclude that this rapid, worldwide shift towards accelerated underwriting creates a spot market for SEOs, and represents the long-predicted shift towards an auction model for seasoned equity sales.
THE RISE OF ACCELERATED SEASONED EQUITY UNDERWRITINGS 1 Introduction
The global investment banking industry has been transformed over the past fifteen years, reflecting the increased role of capital markets in funding and monitoring corporations around the world.
This transformation is partly one of scale, as the total value of securities issued by businesses has (according to the Investment Dealers' Digest's annual league table summaries) risen from $580 billion globally in 1990 to over $7.6 trillion in 2006, and partly one of scope, reflected in the myriad activities conducted by Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, CSFB, and other global banking groups.
Yet even as capital markets have grown in size and sophistication, they have also converged in practices to a remarkable extent. Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) show that U.S.-style bookbuilding has become the dominant method of executing initial public offerings in all major world markets, and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2006) describe how this also seems to be occurring for other types of debt and equity sales. Even failed market experiments have prompted global convergence in banking practices, since Jagannathan and Sherman (2005) and Kutsuna and Smith (2004) show that IPO auctions have failed and been supplanted by bookbuilding in every major world market where firms may choose between auctions and other offering techniques.
In sharp contrast to the eclipse of auctions in IPO markets, we document movement in the opposite direction in the much larger global market for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
2 Seasoned common stock sales executed through accelerated underwritings, which are effectively auctions, have dramatically increased global market share recently, and now account for over half the value of U.S.
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and over two-thirds of European SEOs. 1 We wish to thank Luca Farinola, May Li, Lindsey Scott, Jeff Christensen, Scott Kleman, Kunal Tayal, 3 Two of the three forms of accelerated underwriting-block trades (BTs) and bought deals (BDs)-involve the very rapid sale of large blocks of shares, at an auction-determined market price, directly to an investment bank by the issuing firm or selling shareholder, with little need or capacity for information production with respect to pricing or demand. The winning bank is then responsible for reselling the shares to institutional investors. The third and most popular types of accelerated underwritings, accelerated bookbuilt offerings (ABO), are executed much more rapidly than conventional bookbuilds, but are similar to traditional underwritings in that banks are responsible for the quality of the order book, price stabilization, and transparency of the allocation. Yet, even ABOs have auction-like features, such as aggressive bidding by different banks in terms of the backstop clause, the minimum price guaranteed independently of the outcome of the bookbuilding process.
Accelerated transactions differ qualitatively from established SEO underwriting techniques, which have traditionally been marketed in much the same way as initial public offerings. Seasoned common stock issues must generally follow similar regulatory processes, though streamlined filing and disclosure rules are allowed in many countries. Besides its larger average size, a seasoned offering differs from an IPO in having an observable market value when the offering is priced-which obviously makes pricing much easier. While details differ between countries and across time, the basic features of traditional SEO underwriting practices have remained constant. A firm wishing to raise capital by selling newly issued shares-or a shareholder wishing to sell existing shares-negotiates underwriting terms directly with one or more investment banks, which then forms a syndicate of banks to actually distribute shares to investors. Top managers of companies executing primary, capital-raising offers accompany underwriters on road shows, during which managers tell the company story to potential investors. The underwriters assess institutional investor demand and determine an offer price by building an order book.
Thus, in traditional underwritten offerings, the investment banks managing the offer assess investor demand and use the information received to generate an offer price, expressed as a discount to the closing price of the issuing firms' shares the day before the offering goes effective.
In accelerated underwritings, banks do not generate this information before firmly bidding for the shares, and their principal economic function is to resell the stock. In both block trades and bought deals, the underwriting bank purchases shares directly from the issuing firm or selling shareholder, and is then unconditionally responsible for re-selling the shares (the bank has no recourse to the original seller). In an ABO, the lead-manager bank is able to assess market demand before committing to an underwritten share price-though there is no time to conduct true due diligence before bidding for the underwriting mandate-and shares must be placed very rapidly [Mannix (2003) ]. ABO issuers select the global coordinator based on the backstop clause, underwriting spread, and other profit-sharing agreements. The winning bank then elicits bids from a list of top tier institutional investors in order to ensure a more accurate price for the issue and often engages in price stabilization, at least for the larger ABOs. All three 4 types of accelerated deals thus place a great premium on investment banks' capital base and risk tolerance.
We document and seek to explain the cause of the dramatic rise of accelerated SEOs around the world since 1991. 3 We also ask whether this evolution has been driven by value-maximizing motives for all parties (investors, firms and bankers), or whether it has been driven by predatory corporate behavior.
One possibility is that accelerated deals were pushed on reluctant firms, and their shareholders, by increasingly powerful investment banks in order to increase banking revenues. This is similar to Loughran and Ritter's (2004) "analyst lust hypothesis," posited to explain the sharp rise in IPO underpricing during the late 1990s. We test whether banks have benefited at the expense of firms and investors by examining the costs and pricing of ATs versus traditional SEO deals, and we test whether these underwritings have transferred wealth from investors to corporate managers by examining the market impact of AT announcements.
Our task of describing ATs is especially challenging because the institutional and legal details of accelerated underwritings are so unfamiliar to commentators that even the simplest terminology is hard to nail down. No official descriptions of the three AT forms are provided on security regulators' websites, and the practitioner literature often uses the definitions of various accelerated deals interchangeably. The definition we use is that accelerated underwritings are (1) seller-initiated, underwritten seasoned equity offers; (2) that are completed very rapidly; (3) which do not involve a road show, the pre-issue publication of a detailed prospectus, or anything other than minimal registration with regulatory authorities and exchanges; and (4) are marketed primarily or exclusively to institutional investors. The seller typically announces its intent to sell a block of shares and solicits bids from investment banks. The winning bidder then either buys the block of shares on its own account, and takes responsibility for placing the shares (in a BT or BD), or rapidly assembles a small underwriting syndicate and places the deal within 48 hours (in an ABO). Ours is the first full-length study of accelerated underwritings, and the first to examine the global (rather than European) rise of accelerated deals. Besides documenting the growth of accelerated underwritings, we hope to codify this technique's terminology and begin structuring how this important new security-issuance process can be analyzed by economic, legal and financial scholars.
We find that ATs are faster, cheaper, raise more capital, and have comparable market impacts to traditional SEO underwritings, so there is little evidence that sellers have benefited at investor expense.
While this innovation has transferred market power from banks to issuing firms and selling shareholders, 3 We became aware of the importance of accelerated underwritings while serving as members of the Italian government's Privatization Advisory Committee (the Comitato) from 2002 to 2005. The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance launched two accelerated deals during this period that together raised about $4 billion. To our knowledge, the only published article describing accelerated underwritings is Pappone and Ciampolini (2005) , in the Privatization Barometer Newsletter (http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/newsletter.php?id=3). 5 we conclude that the larger banks have benefited since ATs have allowed them to gain market share due to their relatively larger capital bases and greater risk tolerance. The rise of ATs has unequivocably promoted the institutionalization of capital market trading and investment holdings, though this is not necessarily economically sub-optimal. We show that accelerated deals have become popular with issuers for several reasons, most notably because they are faster and cheaper than marketed deals, expose the issuer to less price risk during the short underwriting period, and have comparable announcement-period market impact. On the other hand, accelerated underwritings do not harm investors. We also show why large investment bankers have embraced accelerated underwritings. Since these deals require banks to have large capital bases and risk tolerances, they have helped the largest banks consolidate their grip on global equity underwriting.
We also contribute several important findings to the academic investment banking literature. Ours is the first truly global event study analysis of the market impact of SEO announcements, as well as one of the first to show that pure secondary and mixed primary and secondary SEOs yield significantly more negative announcement period abnormal returns than do capital-raising, primary offers. We also present a unique analysis of the size of SEO investment banking syndicates-illustrating that accelerated deals yield much smaller, more capital intense, and presumably riskier underwriting syndicates, but these generate comparable revenues over much shorter transactions periods and allow banks to effectively "buy" market share and league table rankings. Finally, we document that very rapid, auction-like underwriting is becoming the norm for seasoned equity offerings, in sharp contrast to IPOs. This should help resolve the academic finance debate on the relative merits of issuing securities by auction versus by intermediated sales. Sensibly, it appears that auctions have decided advantages of cost and speed for issuing securities with low information asymmetries (seasoned equity, bonds), but that intermediaries will always be required to certify IPOs, as Wilhelm (2005) and others argue. This manuscript is organized as follows. Section I describes the evolution of block trades, bought deals, and accelerated book-built offering techniques in North America and Europe since 1982, while section II details our data and sample selection methodology. Section IV contrasts accelerated deals with traditional fully-marketed offerings, while section V econometrically examines whether accelerated deals are less costly than traditional seasoned equity underwritings. Section VI concludes. Extensive details about offer characteristics, industry, and selling methods are presented in the Appendix.
I. The evolution of accelerated underwritings
Accelerated underwriting practices developed independently in three separate national markets during the 1980s and early 1990s, and only began to evolve into a truly standardized global offering method during the late 1990s. In the United States, existing shareholders have long been able to dispose of some or all of their holdings in a firm using a registered, underwritten offering. Confusingly, these 6 secondary offerings-which are not the focus of our study-are also called block trades if they are sold in packages of 10,000 or more shares on one of the major U.S. stock exchanges. These are never primary offerings, but are instead share sales executed principally in upstairs markets by block trade specialists, who often break the offers into many smaller portions for further sale. These "upstairs market" block trades-which are modeled theoretically by Seppi (1990) and studied empirically by Dann, Mayers and Rabb (1977) , Mayers (1987, 1990) , Keim and Madhavan (1996) , and Madhavan and Cheng (1997) -are far smaller and more transaction-related than the trades we examine. 4 The U.S. block trades we study, and the only offerings identified as such by the Securities Data Corporation New Issues database which we employ, are underwritten offerings by the firms themselves (primary offers) or by large shareholders (secondary offers). All of the U.S. primary share sales and all secondary sales executed by existing shareholders with a control relationship to the firm (officers, directors, and controlling corporate owners) must be registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [Keegan (2000) , O'Connor (2006) ]. Capital-raising primary block trades are similar to the offerings examined in most U.S. seasoned equity offering studies-from Bhagat and Hess (1985) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) to Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) and Heron and Lie (2004) -while the secondary block trades are most similar to the registered secondary distributions studied by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) . The block trades in our sample occur only after the adoption of shelf registration (Rule 415) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 1982. This regulatory change allowed companies to shelf register significant amounts of new equity, and then to sell blocks of shares as market conditions allowed any time over the next two years. The first major block trade involving shelfregistered shares, described in Masters (1982) , was Houston Industries' $85 million primary share offering, underwritten by Goldman Sachs in April 1982.
5 As we show in section 3, over 80 percent of U.S. accelerated underwritings involve shelf-registered shares. 4 The average size of the block trades examined in these studies ranges from $340,000 in Keim and Madhavan to $1.8 million in Madhavan and Cheng. The block transactions studied in Mikkelson and Regassa (1991) are also different from both the block trades cited above and the trades we examine in that they examine premiums paid in 37 negotiated third-party purchases and 117 negotiated share-repurchases (greenmail) executed between 1978 and 1987. Several authors also examine block trades in upstairs markets outside the United States, including Anderson, Cooper, and Prevost (2006, Australia) , Smith, Turnbull, and White (2006, Canada) , Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002, Finland) , Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2006, France), and Gemmill (1996, Britain) . As with the United States, the trades examined in these studies are far smaller than the BTs we study, involve different buyers and sellers, and are portfolio-rebalancing rather than corporate financing events. 5 Revealingly, the first two U.S. block trades recorded in the SDC database are the $3.9 million Syncor and the $45.5 million Electronic Data Systems offerings, launched in June and October 1982, respectively. This set a pattern where early block trades we identify by searching Lexis/Nexis are not recorded as such in SDC, and vice versa. To begin building our sample, we read articles from Financial Times, Investment Dealers Digest, the Economist, and numerous Canadian newspapers describing individual deals and the evolution of accelerated underwritings from 1982 to 2004. From these sources we obtained detailed institutional and legal descriptions of about 400 individual deals. This search verified early inconsistencies between SDC and contemporary news reports. By the early 1990s, however, most accelerated deals are recorded as such both in SDC and in the news articles presented in Lexis/Nexis, though as noted these reports often use the terms interchangeably. This observation, coupled with the fact that SDC 7 The block trade underwriting procedure that developed during the mid-1980s is still used today, and works as follows. 6 The issuing firm (or selling shareholder) announces the amount of stock it wishes to sell, and invites banks to bid for these shares, which they do at a discount to the current market price.
The bank offering the lowest discount wins the right to buy the shares, which it then re-sells on the open market-hopefully at a profit and hopefully within 24 hours (preferably overnight). Market risk is transferred unconditionally from issuer to bank with the auction, so issuers can sell shares very rapidly and with little or no price risk, which is a key reason why block trades have proven so popular with sellers. Initially, banks merely acquiesced in conducting block trades, but the larger and more ambitious banks soon realized that these trades offered them the chance to capture underwriting market share through quick, though risky trades. 7 The banks also realized that they could retain all of the underwriting profits in block trades, rather than share these with other syndicate members [Wall Street Journal (1986) ].
Additionally, the large banks realized that participating in accelerated underwritings allowed them to "buy" market share and quickly move up the league table rankings, since these were large deals that were typically sole-managed (not syndicated), so banks received full credit for the entire deal [Tunick (2003) and Skorecki (2004) ].
The second major accelerated underwriting innovation occurred in 1983, when the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) adopted its prompt offering qualification system, which allowed listed Canadian firms to file a short-form prospectus and sell seasoned equity very rapidly [see Critchley (1986) and Critchley and Gittins (1990) ]. This spurred development of the bought deal, which has essentially the same features as the U.S. block trade, but is open only to Canadian issuers, banks and investors. Issuers announce their desire to sell a block of either existing or newly issued shares, and banks either negotiate directly with the issuer (if the bank and issuer have an existing relationship both wish to preserve) or bid for the shares on offer. The winning bank then files the required OSC short-form prospectus and takes title to the shares, with the entire sale typically being completed overnight. The subsequent resale of shares by the underwriter to final investors takes, on average, another 20 days. This is called a bought deal because of the lack of a "market out" clause in the underwriting agreement, meaning that the bank only begins comprehensive coverage of non-U.S. issues in 1991 helped us decide to begin our study then rather than in 1982. 6 Descriptions of U.S. block trade procedures, and their historical evolution, are presented in Taylor (1982) , Pratt (1992 Pratt ( , 1994 , Wirth (1997) , Hahn (2000) , Tunick (2003) , Santini (2004), and Smith (2005) . 7 Accelerated underwritings are inherently risky for investment banks, since this involves bidding for large blocks, priced at very small discounts to trading values, with no time to conduct due diligence, in hopes of quickly reselling these shares to institutional investors at a profit. The banks must purchase these shares directly from issuers, who may be better informed about the firm's prospects than are the banks. Examples of accelerated deals that resulted in underwriter losses are provided in Hahn (2002) , Barber and Skorecki (2003), and Chung (2006) . Perhaps the worst such loss is one we observed first-hand: the Italian government's $2.5 billion ABO of a 6.6 percent stake in ENEL in November 2003, which Morgan Stanley purchased at market price (no discount) after winning a bidding contest with six other banks. ENEL shares fell sharply upon announcement of the ABO, leaving Morgan Stanley with a reported loss of almost $7 million [Tunick (2003) ]. assumes unconditional price risk once it buys the issuer's shares. The bought deal quickly came to dominate Canadian SEOs, and has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite a stiff challenge mounted against the process by banks during 1992 [Simon (1992) ].
Accelerated underwritings spread to Europe during the late 1980s, and slowly around the world thereafter. 8 As described in Barber (1986) and Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) , Reichmann family divested their 9.5 percent stake in Britain's Allied-Lyons PLC in a $900 million secondary offering that was classified as a bought deal at the time [Critchley and Gittins (1991) ]. Years later, this offering became known as the first accelerated bookbuilt offering (ABO), though the first usage of that term in any news article covered by Lexis/Nexis occurred only in July 1997 (Warn (1997) ). As noted, ABOs differ from BTs and BDs in that banks do not immediately purchase stock from the issuer at a fixed price, but instead submit bids for the right to underwrite sale of the block of shares over a short period-usually 48 hours or less. Banks submit competing bids that differ in terms of the backstop price guaranteed, underwriting spread, and placement capabilities. The winning bank then is responsible for very rapidly building an order book and setting a final offer price. In essence, the issuer continues to share price risk with the underwriting bank throughout the short underwriting period, but in return is able to execute larger share placements than with BTs or BDs, because the underwriters do not assume as much unconditional price risk.
8 Plueneke and Templeman (1986) and Shearlock (1994) describe an intriguing earlier (1986), truly international accelerated underwriting, the disastrous $2.1 billion bought deal of two-thirds of the Libyan government's holdings in Italy's Fiat. Deutsche Bank took on this mandate as a way of breaking into investment banking's top tier, but the deal was executed so poorly that syndicate members suffered almost $100 million in losses. 9 The evolution of accelerated underwriting techniques in Europe is described in Barber (1986) , Stevenson (1991) , Sharpe (1995a,b) , Wright (2001) , the Banker (2004), and Stafford (2005) . 10 In fact, writers sometimes use the phrases "bought deal" and "block trade" to refer to the same transaction in a single article! See Santini (2002) and Loades-Carter (2003) for examples. 9 Although there were numerous accelerated underwritings in North America, Europe and elsewhere during the early and late 1990s, traditional fully marketed offerings dominated this period. This was partly due to the fact that, outside of North America, share issue privatizations (SIPs) were the largest and most important types of share issues. These naturally tend to be marketed deals because a key purpose of governments launching SIPs is to sell shares as widely as possible to the voting public-as discussed in Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) . 11 In fact, until the global stock market "break" in seasoned offerings from 1970 on, we begin our study in 1991 because this is when SDC reliably begins covering European and Asian countries. The first selection criterion excludes IPOs, while the underwriting requirement excludes best efforts (BEST EFFORTS) and issues without offering type listed (UNKNOWN). The cash payment criterion excludes non-cash (CAPITALIZATION) issues, and the final criterion screens out TENDER issues. Our purpose is to create a truly global sample of underwritten seasoned equity offerings, which includes capital-raising pure-primary issues, pure-secondary sales of shares by existing stockholders, and mixed offerings including both newly-issued and existing shares, as well as both private-sector share offers and share issue privatization (SIP) sales executed by governments.
In contrast to most published SEO studies, we include offerings from all industries (financial firms and regulated utilities, as well as industrial companies), and offers on public as well as private marketsthough we examine many classifications separately in subsequent analyses to be comparable to existing research.
In all our analyses, we study both the full sample of all SEOs from around the world and country/regional sub-samples. We follow the example of Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) and categorize offerings into one of three country/regional groups: the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world (ROW). Europe is defined in broad geographic terms to include the transition economies of central Europe (including Russia) Table I .
**** Insert Table I The second category, non-accelerated transactions, incorporates all other offering techniques.
Although we will compare ATs to this entire group of seasoned equity underwritings in the empirical analysis below, Table 1 also breaks the non-AT category down further into four additional classifications based on the offering type designations in SDC. Firm commitment underwritings include offers 12 Another challenge we face is that there are a very large number of multi-tranche offers. These become much more common over time (most of the post-2000 deals have multiple tranches), and these tend to be the largest overall issues. Multiple tranches are especially frequent among privatizations (the 1987 DSM offering had seven individual tranches, and one of the British Telecom offers had five tranches). Many accelerated deals have multiple tranches as well; the very first ABO, Allied Lyons in 1991, has two tranches listed. Since the principal focus is on individual offerings, we examine each tranche separately using SDC's variable "amount raised in this market" as the offer amount rather than "amount raised, sum of all markets." This classification poses no problems in comparing issue characteristics (such as size, underwiter spread, percent primary shares, etc) between accelerated and traditional marketed deals, but it does complicate interpreting event study results-since every tranche of a share offering is announced simultaneously. We address this issue in section 5 below. 13 In the vast majority of cases, the AT designation is listed first (block trade/negotiated sale), rather than second (negotiated sale/block trade), which also supports designating all deals involving any of our three techniques as an accelerated transaction. designated as firm commitment, firm commitment/negotiated sale, firm commitment/placement, and other offerings including the firm commitment designation. There are 11,010 firm commitment underwritings raising $1,092.6 billion, of which 6207 (raising $733.7 billion) are from the United States, 328 (raising $36.4 billion) are European, and 4475 (raising $322.5 billion) are from the rest of the world.
There are 1,121 SEOs (raising $81.6 billion) that we categorize as general cash offerings, including 877 European, 242 ROW, and two US offers raising $53.7 billion, $14.7 billion, and $56 million, respectively. This classification includes issues with the SDC designations of offer for sale, offer
for subscription, open offers and other sales classified as "offers." The third non-AT category, placements and allotments, includes offerings designated as placements, third party allotments (virtually all of which are Japanese) and other sales with "placements" in the offering designation. There are 7,205 placements and allotments, raising $562.4 billion, mostly from Europe (2,651 offers, raising $$293.0 billion) and ROW (3,686 offers, raising $220.8 billion). There are only 868 U.S. placements and allotments, which raise $48.5 billion.
The three types of non-AT offering methods described above (firm commitment, general cash offers, and placements and allotments) are all similar in economic terms, since all three involve an underwritten, public offering of shares principally to investors who are not currently holders of the firm's shares. This is also true for the three accelerated underwriting methods, though ATs differ in that they are conducted much more rapidly and generate either no (block trades and bought deals) or very little (ABOs) pricing information during the rapid underwriting and marketing process. The final non-AT underwriting method, rights offerings, differs from all others in being targeted exclusively at the firm's existing shareholders. This grouping includes any offer with "rights" listed as one of the offering methods. Rights, firm commitment/rights, negotiated sale/rights, and rights offers with other names are all included in this category, which collectively encompasses 6,604 offerings (raising $524.6 billion) from Europe (2114 offers, raising $335.1 billion), the United States (364 offers, raising $24.97 billion), and the rest of the world (4136 offers, raising $163.8 billion). As described in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2005) , rights offerings are very common methods of issuing seasoned equity outside of the United States, though our screen of selecting only underwritten offers removes the more common uninsured rights issues from our sample and includes only underwritten (standby, or insured) offers. 14 14 International seasoned equity offer studies that examine rights offers include Bigelli (1998, Italy) , Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997, Norway) , Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005, Sweden) , Eckbo and Norli (2005, Norway) , Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, France) , Loderer and Zimmerman (1988, Switzerland) , Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000, United Kingdom) , and Wu and Wang (2005, Kong Kong) . Most of these studies document non-negative market reactions to announcements of all types of rights issues-and significantly more positive reactions to uninsured rights offer announcements versus insured rights. Despite this, most of these studies document that underwritten offers are gaining market share versus non-underwritten offers generally, and specifically that insured rights are being chosen over uninsured rights wherever regulations allow issuers a choice of offering methods. Figure 2 shows the evolution of seasoned equity offer underwriting methods from 1991 through 2004 for the three country/regional sub-samples. Table II presents the number and value of SEOs executed globally, broken down by offering type between those using traditional, fully marketed underwritings (non-ATs) and those employing some form of accelerated underwriting (Total ATs). Table   II and bought deals in two key ways-speed of execution and assumption of market risk. In BTs and BDs, banks purchase shares directly from the issuing firm or selling shareholder, usually after winning an auction, and then sell the shares on to institutional clients as rapidly as possible. In an ABO, the issuing firm or shareholder awards the winning bank a mandate to very quickly (48 hours or less) arrange an underwriting syndicate to market the issue, thus allowing some price-risk sharing between issuer and underwriter. This presumably allows the issue to be placed at a higher net price or allows for larger offerings at a given price.
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A. The rise of accelerated seasoned equity offering underwritings
The analysis of non-U.S. equity issuance markets reveals wide variability in number and average size of SEOs, as well as in the market penetration of accelerated underwriting techniques. Whereas 
III. How do accelerated underwritings differ traditional underwritings?
The previous section's analyses show that accelerated transactions are gaining market share versus traditional methods of underwriting SEOs, but this alone does not indicate whether ATs are prospering because they are value-maximizing innovations. It seems plausible that ATs have instead been forced on issuing firms and selling shareholders by investment banks pushing a new product that benefits the banks at issuers' expense. In this section and the next, we examine whether ATs are value-maximizing innovations adopted by firms and their shareholders because they reduce issuance costs, or are value-reducing products that transfer wealth to underwriters. We begin by presenting, in Table III, period. This allows us to identify trends in underwriting techniques, and perhaps identify how the rise of accelerated underwritings has prompted a competitive response from banks underwriting traditional SEOs. This table groups all accelerated methods together, and we also compute similar data for the three types of accelerated deals individually. We do not present these in the interest of space, though we note significant findings and the tables are available upon request. Table IV-VI present the same information and univariate tests as in Table III, 
B. Offer size and issuing firm market capitalization
The second through fourth rows of Tables III-VI 
C. Primary, secondary, and mixed offer fractions
Although few empirical studies examine the relative fraction of newly-issued primary shares and already-existing secondary shares in seasoned equity offerings, the handful that do show that primary shares account for between two-thirds and three-fourths of the typical SEO over time. 
D. Number of underwriters
The last offer characteristic we examine is the number of investment banks involved in the syndicate underwriting an SEO. To our knowledge, no other academic study has considered this variable, though we show its importance for both issuers and underwriters. The values in the sixth line of Tables   III-VI 
IV. Are accelerated underwritings less costly for issuers?
Having documented how accelerated underwritings differ from traditional underwritings in terms of offering and placements characteristics, we can now examine whether accelerated deals are more or less costly for issuing firms and selling shareholders than are marketed deals. To make a direct cost comparison between AT and non-AT deals, it helps to define the components of issuing cost for a firm or shareholder selling stock to public investors. As discussed in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2006) and Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) , empirical research has identified three separate valuation impacts relating to the typical seasoned equity offering, most of which are negative (costs). These are (1) the announcement period market impact, calculated as the abnormal return experienced by holders of the firm's stock following announcement of an SEO; (2) the underwriting spread-also called the offer price discount-calculated as the percentage difference between the stock's offering price and the previous trading day's closing price; and (3) the offering day return, or underpricing, defined as the percentage change in value experienced by investors who purchase shares at the offer price and hold these until the close of trading on the offer day.
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that the announcement of an SEO typically causes a U.S. firm's stock price to fall, generally by 2-3 percent. 21 However, empirical studies employing non-U.S. 19 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) explain how investment bankers provide investors with an incentive to reveal their demand for a firm's shares. This information revelation model is recently tested in Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) , Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) , with mixed results. Both Cornelli and Goldreich studies, and the Aggarwal, et al. study, support the idea that bookbuilding is informative and that informative bidders are rewarded with better share allocations, while Jenkinson and Jones find little evidence that bids are informative or that large bidders are rewarded with preferential share allocations. Finally, Sherman and Titman (2003) model the tradeoff a lead underwriter faces when increasing the size of the underwriting syndicate. They find that increasing the size of the syndicate by inviting in more investors increases pricing accuracy-by incorporating more information-but at the cost of greater underpricing. 20 Bhagat (1986) , Bhagat and Frost (1986) , and Hansen and Khanna (1994) examine the choice between competitive and negotiated offerings and find lower costs in negotiated deals. However, competitive offers may only appear to be less costly because the types of firms that use them are different from the types of firms that use negotiated offers. Logue and Tiniç (1999) examine multiple offers by the same firm, AT&T, and find no cost differences in the two offer types. Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) develop and empirically verify a model demonstrating how issuing firms and IB underwriters associaite by mutual choice. Though it seems obvious that firms and IBs should choose each other, previous theoretical models had in fact posited a unidirectional choice. 21 The following U.S. studies all show average announcement period cumulative abnormal returns of between -2.0 percent and -2.7 percent: Hess and Bhagat (1986) , Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) , samples generally show positive (or, at worst, insignificantly negative) announcement period abnormal returns. 22 Underwriting spreads have also been extensively researched, and recent research suggests that spreads for U.S. seasoned offerings are in the range of 4.4 to 5.5 percent [Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996) , Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) , Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003), Mola and Loughran (2004) , Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) , and Butler, Nanda, and Warther (2005)], spreads are lower for shelfregistered than for traditionally underwritten offerings [Butler, Nanda, and Warther (2005) ], spreads are lower for highly liquid firms than for firms with thinly traded stocks [Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) ], and spreads have generally been declining over time [Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003) ]. There are far fewer empirical studies examining spreads on non-U.S. seasoned offerings, but Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) show that average spreads for British placings (6.1 percent) are much higher than for insured (4.6 percent) and uninsured rights (0.4 percent) and Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) document that spreads for non-U.S. initial public offerings average less than half those of American IPOs.
The principal source of variability in spreads on seasoned offerings revolves around whether the issue is a rights offering to current shareholders or a cash offering to outside investors. Non-U.S rights offerings generally have discounts of 20 percent or more [Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000, Britain) , Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, France) , Wu and Wang (2005, Hong Kong) , Bigelli (1998, Italy) ], whereas discounts on comparable public offerings are in the 3-5 percent range. U.S. studies generally find discounts of 1.5-3.5 percent, which have been increasing over time Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003) , and Mola and Loughran (2004) ].
Finally, the underpricing of U.S. seasoned offers has been initially studied by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) for a sample of firm commitments of utility and industrial firms over the 1963-1961 period, finding an average underpricing very close to zero. Several studies have documented an increase in SEO underpricing during the 90s. Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) and Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003) , and
Corwin (2003) finding average first day returns to investors who purchase shares at the offer price in the Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) , Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) , Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) , and Heron and Lie (2004) . Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find much more negative announcement period CARs, -3.56 percent, but their study only examines 80 SEOs, mostly from the 1970s. Schipper and Smith (1986) document the intriguing findings that equity carve-out announcements are associated with significantly positive (+1.8 percent) abnormal returns for parent-firm stocks, but announcements that parent companies are themselves issuing stock yield significantly negative returns (-3.5 percent). Finally, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) show that the market impact of SEO announcements is significantly less negative (-2.0 percent versus -3.3 percent) during hot issuance periods than during periods when fewer SEOs are executed. 22 Non-U.S. studies documenting significantly positive announcement period CARs for SEO announcements include Wu and Wang (2005, Hong Kong) , Bigelli (1998, Italy) , Cooney, Kato, and Schallheim (2003, Japan) , Kang and Stulz (1996, Japan) , Eckbo and Norli (2005, Norway) , and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2006, Sweden) . Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) find that placings [general cash offers] are associated with significantly positive (+3.31 percent) announcement period CARs, whereas rights offering announcements yield roughly symmetrical, significantly negative (-3.09 percent) returns. Finally, Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, France) document insignificantly negative announcement period CARs for public offers, but significantly negative CARs for both types of rights offers examined. These and other international studies are summarized in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2006) . 21 range of 2.6 -2.9 percent, likely due to the increase in the share of more risky Nasdaq issuers. 23 To our knowledge, no single study provides systematic evidence on SEO underpricing in European issues or in the rest of the world. In the next, we will try to fill this gap.
Measuring an SEO's announcement effect, as well as the underwriting spread and underpricing associated with the offer, requires definitive announcement and issue dates. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) report an issue date error rate of roughly 50 percent in the SDC database, so we follow their procedure of identifying the dates on which offers occur by searching Datastream for a significant volume spike near the SDC issue date. Specifically, we track volume over an 11-day window centered on the SDC issue date, and we identify the true issue date as the date on which trading volume is several times larger than the prior day. In most cases, there is no conflict between issue dates, and when we identify a conflict, it is typically a single day. Furthermore, since there is no systematic drift in the closing prices of offering firms during a three day window around the offering, misidentification of the true issue date should not bias our analysis of discounts and underpricing.
SDC identifies a "launch date" for each SEO which typically precedes the issue date. In an attempt to identify clean SEO announcement dates, we compared SDC launch dates to announcement dates found by searching Lexis/Nexis for a random subsample of deals. For each of the randomly selected transactions drawn from the full sample, we searched for SEO announcements on Lexis/Nexis over a two-month window centered on the SDC launch date. In the U.S., the dates we verified on Lexis/Nexis almost always fell within one or two days of the SDC launch date, so a relatively narrow announcement date window of -1,+1 around the launch date captures the true announcement effect of the deal in most cases. For SEOs conducted outside the U.S., the correspondence between Lexis/Nexis announcement dates (when we could find them) and SDC launch dates was much lower. This suggests that researchers conducting event study analysis of SEO announcement dates drawn from SDC may report abnormal returns biased toward zero. In our event study analysis, we report abnormal returns only for those transactions for which we have searched Lexis/Nexis to obtain announcement dates. We also calculate announcement period abnormal returns using several different event windows. Table III shows that global accelerated offerings have significantly-both statistically and economically-lower gross spreads than do traditional SEOs. Whereas underwriting spreads for 23 For completeness, we also note that several researchers [Kang and Stulz (1996, Japan) , Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991, United States) , Median (2005, United States)] examine offer period return, defined as the return to investors from the close of trading the day before an SEO through the close of trading on the offer day, and generally find small though significantly negative CARs of about -1.0 to -2.0 percent. However, it is not clear that these returns really represent a true cost to the issuing firm or selling shareholder, at least not a cost distinct from that already captured by discounts and underpricing. We calculate offer day returns for all of our samples but do not report these, since they are usually quite small. These are available upon request. traditional SEOs average 4.79 percent, spreads on pure ATs are 3.59 and mixed AT spreads average 4.21 percent of the offering price. While AT spreads are significantly higher than non-AT spreads in the United States (3.10 percent for pure and 3.15 percent for mixed ATs versus 2.53 percent for non-ATs) spreads on accelerated deals are only one-half those on marketed deals in Europe (3.46 percent for pure and 3.30 percent for mixed ATs versus 7.07 percent for non-ATs) and are significantly lower for mixed ATs (6.48 percent versus 5.54 percent for non-ATs) in the rest of the world.
A. Underwriter spreads for accelerated versus traditional offerings
Since ATs are substantially larger than non-AT underwritings, it is unsurprising that spreads are significantly lower on these offerings, since Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) and others document major economies of scale-due to the importance of fixed costs-in securities underwriting. To examine whether AT offerings have significantly lower spreads after other factors, particularly issue size, are accounted for, we run several OLS regressions. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table VII .
**** Insert Table VII about here **** These results suggest that even after controlling for other characteristics that affect the gross spread, accelerated transactions reduce spreads. As expected, larger offerings are associated with smaller spreads. U.S. seasoned equity offers have spreads that are, ceteris paribus, around 370 basis points lower than ROW offerings, while European offer spreads are about 20 basis points lower than ROW offerings.
Most critically, accelerated transactions significantly reduce spreads; pure accelerated transaction spreads are, on average, 253 basis points lower than non-accelerated deals. Intriguingly, spreads on ABOs are statistically and economically significantly lower than spreads on the other two types of accelerated underwritings. Since the seller shares some price risk with underwriting banks while the ABO is being arranged-in contrast to BTs and BDs, which are pure auctions-this result suggests that the risk sharing reduces direct underwriting costs. This may partly explain why ABOs have been gaining SEO underwriting market share so strongly in recent years.
B. Underpricing of accelerated versus traditional offerings
Our data confirms that ATs also allow issuers to reap substantial savings in one of the main indirect floatation costs, namely underpricing. For the whole sample, we report an average underpricing of slightly less than 3 percent for ATs, while it is 4.8 percent for non-AT transactions. Thus accelerated deals leave less money on the table than other types of SEO. As Table 3 shows, as compared with nonATs, average underpricing is quite similar when mixed or pure ATs are considered, while some interesting regional differences appear. As Tables IV-VI show, average undepricing in the U.S. is markedly lower than any other region of the world, and especially so as far as non-AT offers are concerned. The U.S. also reveals the lowest difference in underpricing between ATs and non-ATs (78 basis points) while ATs become particularly appealing in comparison to fully marketed offering in Europe, boasting a difference of 4.8 and 4.3 percentage points for mixed and pure ATs, respectively. Regression analyses reported in Table VII corroborate the descriptive analysis. Reassuringly, we find that ATs are significantly less underpriced than any other type of SEOs. The same result holds when pure and mixed ATs are estimated separately, with an economically larger effect attributed to pure deals.
U.S. markets stand out for being most competitive relative to the rest of the world, while the opposite holds for Europe and Canada. As in several other studies, we also find that larger deals are significantly less undepriced. Indeed, economies of scale appear relevant for a more accurate pricing of SEOs.
Interestingly, capital raising offerings are shown to be particularly costly for issuers as a larger fraction of primary shares increases significantly underpricing. Interestingly, we find that ABOs are significantly less underpriced than other types of ATs.
C. Market impact of accelerated and traditional SEO underwriting announcements
For the randomly selected subsample of deals for which we verified announcement dates using Lexis/Nexis, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the three-day period from one trading day before to one trading day after the SEO announcement date (-1, +1). We compute abnormal returns using the market model, which defines expected return as a function of the stock's beta and the reference market's return. Table VIII presents mean and median announcement period abnormal returns for the full (global) sample of SEO announcements, as well as for the 326 accelerated and 1598 nonaccelerated deals and regional sub-samples. For the full sample and for each sub-sample, this table also presents event study results for pure primary, pure secondary, and mixed primary and secondary offerings. We also test the robustness of our results by measuring abnormal returns over windows of (-2,+2) and (-3,+3), and by calculating market-adjusted returns rather than relying on the market model.
None of these alternatives changes our results systematically. **** Insert Table VIII for the 1598 non-AT offerings. While both of these average CARs are significantly negative, the small 0.06 percentage point difference between AT and non-AT deals is not. Examining announcement period abnormal results for the sub-samples based on whether the offering involves existing or newly-issued shares yields striking and highly significant results. The average -2.23 percent (median -2.08 percent)
CAR for the 381 pure secondary offerings is 1.85 percentage points more negative than the -0.38 percent (-1.07 percent) average CAR for the 1236 pure primary offers, and this difference is significant at the one percent level. The 307 mixed primary and secondary offers also have much more negative CAR (-3.06 percent mean, -2.61 percent median) than do the primary share offerings. This suggests that global investors view announcements that current shareholders are selling stock to be much worse news than announcements that the firm itself is selling new equity capital. As we are unaware of any existing multinational SEO announcement period event studies, or any event studies (even of U.S. offerings) examining differential effects of primary versus secondary offerings, the findings detailed above are unique contributions to the empirical literature.
The average CAR for the U.S. sample of 875 SEO announcements is -2.89 percent, while the median is -2.28 percent. These values are reassuringly consistent with previous U.S. seasoned offering event studies that find CARs of between -2 and -3 percent. The 97 accelerated deals have average percent mean, -2.14 percent median) than do the 596 primary offers (+0.99 percent mean, -0.68 percent median), and this 3.13 percentage points difference is significant at the one percent level.
In Table 12 we present a cross-sectional analysis of the announcement CARs. The first regression model uses dummy variables to distinguish the effects of pure and mixed AT deals versus non-AT transactions. The second specification replaces the pure AT dummy with dummies for each of the different types of accelerated transactions: accelerated bookbuilt offers, block trades, and bought deals. The results indicate that AT offerings have announcement effects comparable to non-AT deals.
Announcement effects are significantly more negative for U.S. deals and for deals with a higher fraction of secondary shares.
We can summarize these event study results as indicating that announcements of accelerated offerings have market impacts that are generally similar to announcements of traditional SEOs. The
CARs for ATs are insignificantly higher in the U.S., insignificantly lower in Europe, and significantly lower in ROW, but the average overall market reaction is virtually identical between AT and traditional offers. Most dramatically, we find that secondary share offerings (offers of existing shares by selling shareholders) have a far larger and more negative market impact than do primary, capital-raising offers of newly created shares in the full sample, and in the ROW subsample.
V. Summary and conclusions
Seasoned common stock sales executed through the three types of accelerated underwitingsblock trades, bought deals and accelerated bookbuilt offerings-have raised over $850 billion since 1998, and now account for over half of U.S. seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and over two-thirds of European SEOs. We examine offering terms and announcement-period market impacts of 31,242 SEOs executed around the world during 1991-2004, which raised over $2.9 trillion for issuing firms (in primary offers) and selling shareholders (in secondary offers). We show that accelerated deals have become popular with issuers for several reasons, most notably because they are faster and cheaper than marketed deals, expose the issuer to less price risk during the short underwriting period, and have comparable announcementperiod market impacts. On average, accelerated deals reduce total issuance costs by about 250 basis points, but the cost reduction for European sellers is closer to 400 basis points. Our analysis of European accelerated SEOs suggests that these techniques are helping unwind the traditional cross-shareholdings that have typified European corporate finance for a century.
Ours is the first truly global event study analysis of the market impact of SEO announcements, as well as one of the first to show that pure secondary and mixed primary and secondary SEOs yield significantly more negative announcement period abnormal returns than do capital-raising, primary offers. We also present a unique analysis of the size of SEO investment banking syndicates-illustrating that accelerated deals yield much smaller, more capital intensive, and presumably riskier underwriting syndicates, but these generate comparable revenues over much shorter transactions periods and allow banks to effectively "buy" market share and league table rankings. Finally, we document that rapid, auction-like underwriting is indeed becoming the norm for seasoned equity offerings, but not for IPOs.
This should help resolve the academic finance debate on the relative merits of issuing securities by auction versus by intermediated sales. We conclude that this rapid, worldwide shift towards accelerated underwriting is commoditizing seasoned equity sales, and creating a spot market for SEOs. This represents the long-predicted shift towards an auction model for seasoned equity sales.
Taken together, our findings highlight three major trends that are shaping global investment banking. First, the fact that accelerated deals are marketed almost exclusively to institutional investors, and that these underwriting methods are gaining market share, suggests the declining importance of retail investors to equity markets everywhere. Second, the rise of accelerated deals both promotes and reflects increasing concentration in the investment banking industry, since only the largest banks have the capital 
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Total ATs (pure and mixed) This table reports the estimated coefficients of OLS regressions of underwriting spreads and underpricing. Underwriting spread is given by the percentage difference between the stock's offering price to the public and the previous trading day's closing price. Underpricing is the percentage change in value experienced by investors who purchase shares at the offer price and hold these until the close of trading on the offer day. AT is a dummy variable for any accelerated transaction (pure and mixed combined). Pure AT is a dummy variable for an pure accelerated transaction. Mixed AT is a variable for a pure accelerated transaction. ABO, BT, and BD are dummy variables for accelerated bookbuilt offers, block trades, and bought deals respectively. U.S. and Europe are dummy variables for issues originated in the United States, or in Europe, respectively. % Primary is the fraction of the offering representing primary (newlycreated) shares. Offer size is the natural log of gross offer proceeds, in $U.S. million. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This table presents cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates of seasoned equity offerings around the world and in various regional sub-samples, using announcement dates that have been verified as the earliest mentions of seasoned equity offers through a manual search of Lexis/Nexis. Abnormal returns were generated using market-model expected returns. 
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